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Multiple oil and gas related issues have been addressed over the past 
year. This article will summarize and discuss various case law, legislative, 
and regulatory developments related to the oil and gas industry in North 
Dakota from August 1, 2015 to July 1, 2016.   
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
The North Dakota Legislature did not have a regular session in 2016. 
Therefore, it did not enact any new oil and gas legislation. 
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A. November Ballot 
The North Dakota electorate will decide on a proposed constitutional 
amendment in the November election. The proposed amendment changes 
how a certain percentage of the revenue from oil extraction taxes from 
taxable oil produced in North Dakota will be allocated and distributed. The 
measure is intended to expand the educational purpose for which the 
foundation aid stabilization fund may be used.  
B. North Dakota Industrial Commission, Department of Mineral Resources, 
Oil and Gas Division 
On June 29, 2016, the North Dakota Industrial Commission, Department 
of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas Division (“Commission”) approved 
additions and amendments to the North Dakota Administrative Code 
Chapters 43-02-03, 43-02-05, and 43-02-08, which address new 
requirements for the oil and gas industry in areas such as saltwater handling 
facilities, underground gathering pipelines, and spill containment.1 Outlined 
below are some of amendments instituted by the Commission. 
The Commission instituted new regulations concerning underground 
gathering pipelines.2 These regulations included new notice and inspection 
requirements for underground gathering pipelines, as well as new bonding 
requirements for crude oil and produced water underground gathering 
pipelines.3 The Commission also amended and expanded regulations 
concerning the design, construction, operation, maintenance and 
abandonment of underground gathering pipelines.4 
The Commission also included new permitting and bonding 
requirements for new and existing saltwater handling facilities.5 
Additionally, the Commission promulgated a variety of new regulations and 
requirements regarding the construction, operation, abandonment and 
reclamation of such facilities.6 The Commission further established new 
requirements for construction of perimeter berms to provide emergency 
containment around saltwater handling facilities, storage facilities and 
production sites, and treatment plants.7  
                                                                                                                 
 1. NORTH DAKOTA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/ (last 
visited September 23, 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss3/17
2016] North Dakota 253 
 
 
The Commission’s website contains a complete description of these new 
policies.8 The tentative effective date for these rules is October 1, 2016.9 
III. Judicial Developments 
A. The Supreme Court of North Dakota 
1. No Private Right of Action for Damages Under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-
06.4: Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co. 
N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4 restricts the flaring of gas produced with crude oil 
from an oil well and provides that a “producer shall pay royalties to royalty 
owners upon the value of the gas flared” for wells operated in violation of 
the statute.10 In Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co., the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota addressed whether there is an implied right of action for damages 
under the statute.11 Sarah Vogel, a royalty owner, sued Marathon Oil 
Company alleging that Marathon flared gas in violation of the statute and 
failed to pay royalties on the value of the flared gas.12 Vogel sought 
declaratory relief and money damages under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4 and the 
Environmental Law Enforcement Act (“ELEA”).13 She also sought 
damages under common law for conversion and waste.14 The district court 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that N.D.C.C. § 38-08-
06.4 does not provide an expressed or implied private right of action and 
further concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because 
Vogel did not exhaust her administrative remedies.15 Vogel appealed the 
district court judgment.16 
Upon review, the Court noted that N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4 does not 
expressly provide for a private right of action.17 Vogel argued, however, 
that a private right of action was implied in the statute.18 After a review of 
statutory language and legislative intent, the Court found there is not an 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. 879 N.W.2d 471, 476 (N.D. 2016) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-08-06.4(4) 
(West 2016)). 
 11. Id. at 474.  
 12. Id. at 474-75. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 475. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 476.  
 18. Id. 
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implied private right of action for violation of the statute.19 Instead, the 
statute contains a comprehensive regulatory scheme that provides an 
administrative remedy to royalty owners for a violation of N.D.C.C. § 38-
08-06.4.20  
 The Court then addressed Vogel’s claim that the ELEA provided a 
private right of action to enforce N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4.21 The ELEA 
authorizes a private right of action for any person aggrieved by the violation 
of any environmental statute.22 While the Court agreed that the N.D.C.C. § 
38-08-06.4 is an environmental statute as defined by the ELEA, it noted 
that any remedies provided by the ELEA “are cumulative and do not 
replace statutory or common law.”23 The Court held that the administrative 
remedies available under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-08 must be pursued “before an 
‘aggrieved person’ may bring a private action under the ELEA,” which 
provides a cumulative remedy that may be pursued if the Commission fails 
or refuses to act.24 Therefore, “Vogel [was] required to exhaust her 
administrative remedies prior to pursuing any claims she may have in 
court.”25 
The Court further addressed Vogel’s common law claims of conversion 
and waste for damages for unpaid royalties on the flared gas.26 The Court 
discussed that N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4 regulates the flaring of gas from oil 
wells, gives royalty owners the right to receive royalties on gas flared in 
violation of the statute, and provides a remedy for the royalty owner when 
the statute is violated, “replacing common law claims for royalties on flared 
gas.”27 The Court then found that the statute is designed to cover the entire 
field relating to royalties for flared gas and as a result N.D.C.C. § 38-08-
06.4 governs any claim for royalties for flared gas.28 Therefore, the district 
court did not err in dismissing Vogel’s common law claims.29 
CONCURRING OPINION: Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a separate 
opinion concurring in result but outlining concerns with the precedent that 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 477.   
 20. Id. at 477-78.   
 21. Id. at 480.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 480-81.  
 24. Id. at 481.  
 25. Id. at 485.  
 26. Id. at 482-83.  
 27. Id. at 482. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 483.  
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may be established if the majority’s opinion is read too broadly.30 The 
concurring opinion discussed concerns regarding potential interference with 
the contractual relationship between the lessor and the lessee and the rights 
of the lessor under the lease.31 Further the concurring opinion expressed 
concern the decision “will be cited as the basis for the position that 
N.D.C.C. § 38-08-06.4(5) is the exclusive remedy for lessors or, at the very 
least, the portal through which all lessors must pass before being allowed to 
bring a private cause of action against the lessee for royalties for flared gas 
under their leases,” and indicated the opinion should not be cited as such.32 
DISSENTING OPINION: Justice Kapsner wrote a detailed dissenting 
opinion regarding the majority’s finding that the royalty owner was 
required to exhaust her administrative remedies before she could bring a 
private action under the ELEA.33 The dissenting opinion argued that the 
“majority ignored the straightforward legal concept” of a “cumulative 
remedy” and confused the nature of such remedies.34 The dissent further 
asserted that, by requiring an aggrieved person to first exhaust 
administrative remedies before bringing an action under the ELEA, the 
majority’s holding “eviscerates the ELEA” and effectively removed the 
private enforcement power it was meant to provide.35 In doing so, the 
majority disregarded the plain language of the ELEA and frustrated its 
purpose.36 The dissent also argued that the majority’s holding was 
inconsistent with other jurisdictions’ treatment of similar legislation.37 
Noting that prior to the majority’s opinion, the Court had not yet interpreted 
North Dakota’s ELEA.38 The dissenting opinion maintained that “[t]he 
majority’s inaugural interpretation here strips the statute of the very purpose 
the legislature expressed for its enactment” and disregards the very reason it 
was adopted.39 
  
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 485-86.  
 31. Id. at 485.  
 32. Id. at 486.  
 33. Id. at 486-91.  
 34. Id. at 489-90.  
 35. Id. at 486.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 486-89. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 489-90. 
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2. Royalty Interests Cannot Not Be Considered Abandoned if Related 
Mineral Interests are In Use: Yesel v. Brandon. 
In Yesel v. Brandon,40 surface owners, Phyllis Yesel and Gloria Van 
Dyke, brought an action to quiet title against nonparticipating royalty 
interest owners alleging the abandoned mineral statutes found in N.D.C.C. 
ch. 38-18.1 applied to the royalty interests and that the minerals in fact had 
been abandoned.41 Under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-02, any mineral interest 
unused for a period of twenty years immediately preceding the first 
publication of the notice is deemed to be abandoned.42 Title to the 
abandoned mineral interest then vests in the owners of the surface estate.43 
The district court granted summary judgment for the royalty owners 
holding that the abandoned mineral statutes did not apply to royalty 
interests and even if they did, the royalty interest was used in the previous 
twenty years.44 The surface owners then appealed.45 Christian Teigen, an 
heir to the named royalty owners, cross appealed from a judgment denying 
his motion to file a counterclaim and his motion for attorneys’ fees.46 
On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the royalty interests were 
used during the previous twenty years and thus found it unnecessary to 
address the issue of whether the abandoned mineral statutes apply to royalty 
interests.47 Since the mineral interests related to the defendants’ royalty 
interests were covered by numerous leases, were subject to a pooling order, 
and were producing oil from at least two wells, it was undisputed that the 
mineral interests were used within the twenty-year period prior to the notice 
of lapse.48 Given that a royalty interest owner cannot develop or produce 
the related mineral interest but can only receive a share of the proceeds of 
production mineral, the Court held that “a royalty interest cannot be 
considered abandoned if the related mineral interest is being used under 
N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-03(1)”49 and affirmed summary judgment in favor the 
royalty owners.50  
                                                                                                                 
 40. 867 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 2015). 
 41. Id. at 679. 
 42. Id. at 681. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 680.  
 45. Id. at 679. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 680–81.  
 48. Id. at 682.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 685. 
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Regarding the issues raised on cross appeal, the Court found that the 
district court abused its discretion and misapplied the law regarding 
compulsory counterclaims when it denied the motion to file the 
counterclaim and remanded for reconsideration of that motion.51 As to the 
motion for attorneys’ fees, however, the Court concluded the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion.52 
3. Meaning of “Production” and an Approach for Determining 
“Production in Paying Quantities” Addressed: Fleck v. Missouri River 
Royalty Corp. 
In Fleck v. Missouri River Royalty Corp.,53 the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota concluded that the district court, in finding that production in 
paying quantities was not required to extend a lease, misapplied the law in 
its interpretation of the lease.54 The lease at issue was executed in 1972.55 
The term of the lease was for ten years and “as long thereafter as oil or gas, 
or either of them, is produced from said land by the lessee, its successors 
and assigns.”56 The lease also contained a savings clause which provided 
that if production ceased after the expiration of the primary term, the lease 
would not expire if, within ninety days of cessation, the lessee resumed 
operations to drill a well or to restore production.57 In 1982, a well was 
completed on the property thereby extending the lease.58 In 2012, Nathaniel 
Fleck and Alma Bergmann, as trustees of the George J. Fleck Trust 
(collectively “Fleck”),  owner of the mineral interest covered by the lease, 
brought an action to quiet title, alleging that the well stopped producing in 
paying quantities in 2010, and the lease had therefore expired.59  
The district court declared that the lease was valid and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the lessees.60 The district court, in concluding that the 
lease remained in full force and effect at all times, found that the well 
produced a few barrels per day on average, any temporary cessation of 
production was timely restored, and production in paying quantities was not 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 872 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 2015). 
 54. Id. at 331. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 332. 
 57. Id. at 335.   
 58. Id. at 331.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
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necessary to extend the lease.61 Fleck appealed the district court’s 
findings.62 
On appeal, the Court examined the definition of the term “production,” 
as it was not specifically defined in the lease.63  Noting that technical words 
are to be interpreted as they would be by persons working in the related 
profession, the Court found that, in absence of a definition, the term 
“production” is “generally interpreted to mean ‘production in paying 
quantities’” when the term is used in a “so long thereafter” clause in an oil 
and gas lease. 64 The Court further noted that this interpretation has 
generally been adopted because the objective of a lease is to obtain 
production of oil or gas in quantities that are commercially profitable to 
both parties, and parties generally do not intend for the lease to be held for 
speculative purposes only. 65 Therefore, the Court held that in this case, the 
term “production” as used in the habendum clause meant “production in 
paying quantities.” 66 In addition, the Court looked at the savings clause of 
the lease and held that “production” as used in the savings clause must also 
be interpreted as “production in paying quantities” for the same reasons.67 
After reviewing past decisions and approaches used in other 
jurisdictions, the court agreed with the rationale used by Texas and other 
courts, holding that “[a] court must consider whether the well yielded a 
profit over operating costs over a reasonable period of time and whether a 
reasonable and prudent operator would continue to operate a well in the 
manner in which the well was operated under the relevant facts and 
circumstances.”68 Finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed 
regarding whether the well was producing in paying quantities, the Court 
reversed and remanded the case.69 
4. Specific “No Deductions” Language Prevails Over General “Market 
Value at the Well” Provision: Kittleson v. Grynberg Petroleum Co. 
In Kittleson v. Grynberg Petroleum Co.,70 the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota affirmed that the meaning of “market value at the well” can be 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 333. 
 64. Id. (quoting Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 848 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 2014)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 335.  
 69. Id. at 336. 
 70. 876 N.W.2d 443 (N.D. 2016). 
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contractually modified.71 In 1991, Grynberg Petroleum Company 
(collectively with its successors in interest “Grynberg” or “Lessee”) and 
Tyronne and Marilyn Kittleson (“Lessor”) entered into an oil and gas lease 
and executed a separate rider that modified and amended the lease.72 The 
royalty clause in the lease specified that the Lessor was be to paid the 
market value at the well for all gas produced and sold by the Lessee from 
the leased premise, “provided however, that there shall be no deductions 
from the value of Lessor's royalty of any required processing, cost of 
dehydration, compression, transportation, or other matter to market such 
gas.”73 The gas produced was a sour gas and had to be processed to be 
made marketable.74 After the sale of the gas and liquids, Grynberg 
calculated the Lessor’s royalty payment by deducting post-production costs 
using “the work-back method.”75 A suit was filed claiming that post-
production costs were wrongfully deducted because the language contained 
in the royalty clause prohibited such deductions.76 After a bench trial, the 
district court determined that, based on terms in the royalty clause, 
Grynberg was not allowed to deduct processing costs from the royalties 
paid to the Lessor.77 Applying the ten-year statute of limitations, the district 
court entered a judgment awarding underpaid royalties, interest on the 
underpaid royalties, and attorney’s fees.78 
On appeal, Grynberg argued that the Court’s holding in Bice v. Petro-
Hunt, LLC79 controlled and allowed it to deduct post-production costs from 
the royalty payments.80 In its interpretation of the “market value at well,” 
the Court in Bice adopted the “at the well rule,” which allows a lessee to 
use the work-back method to calculate the gas or oil market value at the 
well and to deduct post-production costs from its proceeds before 
calculating royalty.81 The Court rejected Grynberg’s argument, noting that 
facts in the present case were distinguishable from Bice.82 While the royalty 
clauses in both cases required the Lessor to be paid the market value at the 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 450.  
 72. Id. at 445.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 446.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. (citing Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 768 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 2015)).  
 80. Kittleson, 876 N.W.2d at 447.  
 81. Id. at 446-47.  
 82. Id. at 447. 
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well for all gas produced from the leased premise, here the lease contained 
additional “no deduction” language that was not included in the lease in 
Bice.83 Noting that the “market value at the well” and the “no deductions” 
terms in present lease conflict, the Court held that the more specific “no 
deduction” language controlled.84 Therefore, the Court concluded that 
under the “no deductions” language of the royalty clause, Grynberg could 
not deduct post-production costs.85  
5. Court Interprets the Interests Conveyed in Multiple Deeds to 
Railroad: EOG Resources Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co. 
In EOG Resources Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co.,86 the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota interpreted whether deeds granting interests to a railroad 
company conveyed a fee simple interest or an easement.87 EOG Resources, 
Inc. (“EOG”) brought an action to quiet title claiming that Soo Line 
Railroad had no interest in the minerals in and under the disputed 
property.88 In dispute were sixteen parcels of land acquired by Soo Line 
through seven deeds, a condemnation order, and an Act of Congress.89 The 
parties stipulated that the Act of Congress only granted an easement.90 The 
district court granted EOG’s motion for summary judgment finding that 
Soo Line only had an easement across the disputed properties.91 Soo Line 
Railroad appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that 
the seven deeds conveyed only an easement.92 Soo Line Railroad did not 
appeal the district court’s finding regarding the condemnation order. 93 
On appeal, in support of the finding for summary judgment, EOG relied 
on Lalim v. Williams County,94 where the Court had previously determined 
that a deed to the county road system only conveyed an easement.95 
However, in its review, the Court distinguished Lalim by finding that the 
deed in Lalim was from a private party to the government, whereas in the 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. 867 N.W.2d 308 (N.D. 2015). 
 87. Id. at 310.  
 88. Id. at 311. 
 89. Id. at 312. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 313. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 314 (citing Lalim v. Williams Cnty., 105 N.W.2d 339 (N.D. 1960)). 
 95. Id. at 314–15.  
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present case, the deeds are from private parties to a private party.96 
Additionally, it found that the deeds in the present case contain different 
granting language from the deed in Lalim.97 
The Court instead relied on the specific granting language of the deeds to 
determine the grantors’ intent.98 The language of six of the seven deeds 
stated that the grantors “do hereby GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL and 
CONVEY unto the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, 
a piece, parcel or tract of land.”99 Specifically noting that “conveyances to 
railroads that purport to grant and convey a strip, piece, parcel, or tract of 
land, and do not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose 
to which the land is to be put . . . are usually construed as passing an estate 
in fee.”100 The Court concluded these six deeds were unambiguous and 
granted a fee simple estate.101  
The Court then found the language of the seventh deed ambiguous, 
stating, “Although the deed on its face conveys the property in fee simple, 
the property description creates ambiguity about whether the parties 
intended to convey a lesser estate.”102 Since there could be reasonable 
differences of opinion regarding the inferences to be drawn from such 
language, summary judgment was inappropriate.103 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and determined that six 
deeds were unambiguous and conveyed a fee simple estate and judgment 
should be entered in favor of Soo Line. 104 The Court further remanded the 
case for trial on the seventh deed only, as it was ambiguous, and stated that 
on remand the district court may consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the 
parties’ intentions. 105 
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion and 
Justice Sandstrom wrote a separate dissenting opinion.106 Both opinions 
argue that all of the deeds were ambiguous and that the entire case should 
be remanded for trial.107  
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 315. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 317.  
 99. Id. at 316.  
 100. Id. at 317 (quoting 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 45 (2015)). 
 101. Id. at 321–22.  
 102. Id. at 322.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 323-24. 
 107. Id.  
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6. Court Interprets Language Contained in Warranty Clause as a 
Reservation of Mineral Interests in the Grantors: Johnson v. Shield. 
In Johnson v. Shield,108 the Supreme Court of North Dakota was asked to 
interpret the language of deed.109 At issue was whether specific language 
contained in the warranty clause of a deed constituted a reservation of 
mineral interest in the grantors.110 On December 8, 1942, Eugenie and Roy 
Goldenberg executed a warranty deed for a certain tract of land unto Julian 
and Arthur Johnson.111 At the time of the conveyance, the Goldenbergs 
owned all of the minerals associated with the conveyed tract.112 While the 
granting clause of the warranty deed did not address mineral interests, the 
warranty clause provided that the Goldenbergs  
covenant . . . that they are well seized in fee of land, real estate 
and premises aforesaid, and have good right to sell and convey 
the same in manner and form aforesaid; that the same are free 
from all encumbrances, but reserving, however, to the grantor 
fifty per cent (50%) of all of the oil, gas, hydro-carbons and 
minerals in or with respect to said real property.113 
Eric A. Johnson and others (collectively “Johnson”), successors in 
interest to Julian and Arthur Johnson, brought an action to quiet title 
seeking a determination that the deed conveyed all of the minerals located 
under the property conveyed.114 On cross-motions for summary judgment, 
however, the district court found that the deed unambiguously reserved 
unto the Goldenbergs fifty percent of the minerals from their conveyance 
and granted summary judgment in favor of Suzanne M. Shield and others 
(collectively “Shield”), successors in interest to Eugenie and Roy 
Goldenberg.115  
On appeal, Johnson, relying on the Court’s decision in Muller v. 
Strangeland,116 argued that the reservation language in the warranty clause 
only constituted a limitation on the warranty, not a reservation of the 
                                                                                                                 
 108. 868 N.W.2d 368 (N.D. 2015). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 369. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 370. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 371 (citing Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D. 1983)). 
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minerals.117 In response, the Court acknowledged that exceptions inserted 
in the warranty clauses are usually only intended to protect the grantor on 
the warranty and not meant to be a limitation on the interest conveyed in the 
granting clause.118 The Court noted, however, that “reservations or 
exceptions of property interest may appear in any part of a deed, including 
the warranty clause.” 119 Focusing on the phrase, “reserving . . . to the 
grantor,” the Court reasoned the phrase made no sense in the context of a 
limitation on the warranty.120 Therefore, the Court concluded that “the 
disputed language here is so explicit as to leave no room for doubt that it 
was intended to be a reservation of mineral interests in the Goldenbergs 
rather than a limitation on the warranty.”121  
7. Disputed Issues of Material Fact Regarding Whether the Plaintiffs 
Were Good Faith Purchasers for Value, Precluded Summary Judgment: 
Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson 
In Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson,122 the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota faced an issue revolving around an unrecorded deed. Sometime 
before 1990, Elmer Benson conveyed a one-fifth share of mineral interests 
in 160 acres to each of his named grandchildren, Edward Benson, John 
Benson, Louise Benson, Geri Benson, and Ann Kemske.123 In 1990, Ann 
Kemske and her husband conveyed and quitclaimed, by deed, all right, title, 
and interest in the 160 acres to Thomas Benson.124 This deed was not 
recorded until April 9, 2012.125 On April 15, 2010, Ann Kemske conveyed, 
by mineral deed, all right, title, and interest in minerals to 1,720 acres, 
including the 160 acres in dispute, to Family Tree.126 This deed was 
recorded May 12, 2010.127 Family Tree then conveyed twenty acres of the 
160 acres to Desert Partners by deed dated May 12, 2010, and recorded 
June 2, 2010.128 Desert Partners and Family Tree brought an action to quiet 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 372.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 371.  
 120. Id. at 372 (emphasis in the original).  
 121. Id. at 372–73.  
 122. 875 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 2016). 
 123. Id. at 511-12.  
 124. Id. at 512.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
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title.129 John Benson filed an answer, claiming, in part, that the disputed 
interest had been conveyed unto him and his son, Ben Benson, by Thomas 
Benson, and arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to make a reasonable and 
diligent inquiry regarding the ownership of the disputed mineral 
interests. 130 After its initial ruling of summary judgment was reversed and 
remanded due to improper notice of the hearing, the district court again 
granted summary judgment in favor of Desert Partners and Family Tree.131  
On appeal, John Benson claimed that a statement of claim of mineral 
interests was recorded in November 2005 stating Thomas Benson, Leatrice 
Benson, Edward Benson, Louise Benson Kack, Geri Benson, and Ann 
Kemske were the record owners of the disputed minerals.132 Accordingly, 
he argued, that Plaintiffs were not good faith purchasers for value because 
they should have inquired into the ownership of the minerals.133 The Court 
found that “[t]he statement of claim provides constructive notice on the 
record about Ann Kemske's ownership and authority to convey the disputed 
mineral interests in 2010, when she executed the mineral deed to Family 
Tree.”134 The Court further concluded that the statement of claim imposed a 
duty on Family Tree to make further inquiries regarding the ownership of 
the disputed mineral interests, and therefore Family Tree was deemed to 
have constructive notice of the facts that an inquiry would have revealed.135 
Therefore, the Court, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as 
to whether the Plaintiffs were good-faith purchasers for value, reversed the 
motion for summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.136   
8. Court Holds that Language Contained in Land Manager’s Letter Did 
Not Modify Lease: Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC. 
In Valentina Williston, LLC v. Gadeco, LLC,137 the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota affirmed a ruling against a top lessee, finding that the primary 
lease had not expired and promissory estoppel was not applicable.138 On 
May 4, 2007, Leroy and Norma Seaton executed an oil and gas lease unto 
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Gadeco, LLC (“Gadeco”) covering various sections of land.139 The lease 
had a primary term of five years and contained a “continuing operations 
clause” that allowed the primary term to be extended if no more than ninety 
days elapsed between the completion or abandonment of one well and the 
beginning of drilling operations of the subsequent well. 140 A well was spud 
on the property on August 31, 2011. 141 On February 9, 2012, the Seatons 
entered into a top lease with Valentina Exploration, LLC covering the same 
section of land already under lease with Gadeco.142 On March 5, 2012, a 
land manager for Gadeco sent a letter to lessors stating that  
[p]ursuant to the terms of your Oil and Gas lease with us, dated 
May 4, 2007 . . . this fulfills our obligation to drill a well and 
hold your lease acreage in Sections 5, 8, and 18 beyond its 
primary term. As indicated by the lease, we are tendering a 
payment of $230.02 which constitutes a shut-in royalty equal to 
$1.00 per net acre. In addition, per the terms of your lease with 
us, if no wells are spud prior to the lease expiration of May 4[,] 
2012, then the acreage in Sections 6 and 7 will terminate.143 
Subsequently, within fifty-five days after the primary term, Gadeco 
completed wells on Sections 6 and 7.144 Valentina Williston sued for 
declaratory judgment and quiet title arguing, in part, that the due to the 
effect of the land manager’s letter, the lease was terminated as a matter of 
law and also that the letter invoked “the doctrine of estoppel.”145 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gadeco.146  
On appeal, the Court noted that the lease outlined specific duties if the 
lessee were to surrender the lease but did not contain provisions on how the 
parties could modify it.147 The Court found that the letter did not meet the 
requirement for surrender.148 Then, relying on contract theories, the Court 
stated that in order for Valentina Williston to succeed, it must show that the 
letter was a written contract that modified the lease.149 Upon review, the 
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Court concluded that the letter did not modify the lease because there was 
no offer or consideration.150 Additionally, even if the letter contained an 
offer, there was no acceptance.151  
 The Court also addressed Valentina Williston's argument regarding 
promissory estoppel, finding that the letter did not contain “a clear, definite, 
and unambiguous promise.”152 Thus, the promissory estoppel was 
inapplicable.153 The ruling of the district court was affirmed.154  
B. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
1. Pugh Clause Interpreted to Divide Lease at Section Boundary: 
Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Moen. 
In Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Moen,155 the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, applying North Dakota law, interpreted a Pugh 
clause in favor of the lessee.156 The lease in question, executed in 1984, 
leased five sections of land (using the Public Land Survey System), for a 
term of five years and “thereafter as long as oil and gas is [sic] produced 
from said land or Lessee is engaged in drilling or reworking operations, 
thereon.”157 The lease also contained a Pugh clause which stated, 
This lease shall terminate at the end of the primary term as to all 
of the leased lands except those lands located within the same 
section of a production unit[] or spacing unit prescribed by law 
or administrative authority on which is located a well producing 
or capable of [] producing oil or gas in commercial quantities.158 
At the end of the primary term of the lease, Section 3 contained two 
active wells and each was assigned a spacing unit.159 A spacing unit is an 
administrative created boundary assigned by North Dakota Commission 
“for drilling, producing and proration purposes,” which is used to prevent 
waste, avoid unnecessary drilling, and protect correlative rights.160 The first 
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well was assigned a 160 acre spacing unit comprised of the northwest 
quarter of Section 3 and the second well was assigned a 160 acre spacing 
unit comprised of the northeast quarter of Section 3. 161 The southwest 
quarter, however, was not included within any spacing unit with an active 
well. 162  The primary dispute was whether the Pugh clause divided the 
lease at the spacing unit boundaries or the section boundaries.163 
Essentially, the issue was whether the entire section was held by production 
anywhere on that section or, in the alternative, did the Pugh clause divide 
the lease such that the lease expired at the end of the primary term as to all 
land not contained in a spacing unit with an active well.164 The district court 
agreed with the Northern Oil and Limsco that the division line is the section 
boundary, not the spacing boundary, and entered summary judgment in 
their favor.165  
On appeal, the Court considered the specific language of the Pugh 
clause, as well as the parties’ interpretations regarding the meaning of the 
phrase “the same section of.”166 Noting that neither side proposed an 
interpretation that gave meaning to both of the disputed terms “section” and 
“of,” the Court found Northern Oil and Limsco’s interpretation to be more 
persuasive and less damaging to the plain language of the Pugh clause.167 
Therefore, the Court adopted the interpretation of Northern Oil and Limsco 
such that the Pugh clause divided the lease at the section boundaries and 
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